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Abstract
We study two-player zero-sum recursive games with a countable state space and finite
action spaces at each state. When the family of n-stage values {vn, n ≥ 1} is totally bounded
for the uniform norm, we prove the existence of the uniform value. Together with a result
in Rosenberg and Vieille [12], we obtain a uniform Tauberian theorem for recursive game:
(vn) converges uniformly if and only if (vλ) converges uniformly.
We apply our main result to finite recursive games with signals (where players observe
only signals on the state and on past actions). When the maximizer is more informed
than the minimizer, we prove the Mertens conjecture Maxmin = limn→∞ vn = limλ→0 vλ.
Finally, we deduce the existence of the uniform value in finite recursive game with symmetric
information.
Keywords: Stochastic games, recursive games, asymptotic value, uniform value, Tauberian
theorem, maxmin
1 Introduction
Stochastic games were introduced by Shapley [13] to model a multiplayer dynamic interaction,
where players’ collective decisions influence the current payoff and also the future state. In
this article, we focus on two-player zero-sum recursive games introduced by Everett [2]. The
specificity of a recursive game is that the state space is divided into two sets: absorbing states
and active states. On absorbing states, the process is absorbed and the payoff is fixed. On active
(non-absorbing) states, the payoff is always equal to 0.
There are several ways to evaluate the payoff stream in a zero-sum stochastic game. Given
a positive integer n, the n-stage payoff is the expected average payoff during the first n stages.
Given λ ∈ (0,1], the λ-discounted payoff is the Abel mean of the infinite stage payoffs with a
weight λ(1−λ)t−1 for stage t. We will focus on the concept of uniform value. A stochastic game
admits a uniform value if both players can approximately guarantee the same payoff level in all
sufficiently long n-stage games without knowing a priori the length of the game.
Mertens and Neyman [7] proved that a stochastic game with a finite state space and finite
set of actions where the players observe the current state and the stage payoffs admits a uniform
value. Their proof uses the fact that the function λ ↦ vλ has bounded variation, where vλ is the
λ-discounted value (Bewley and Kohlberg [1]). For stochastic games with an infinite state space,
this argument in general does not apply.
Markovian decision processes (henceforth MDP) are stochastic games with only one player.
Lehrer and Sorin [5] showed that in a MDP, the uniform convergence of (vλ) (w.r.t. the initial
state) as λ tends to zero is equivalent to the uniform convergence of the n-stage values (vn) as
n tends to infinity. Nevertheless, uniform convergence of (vn) or (vλ) is not sufficient for the
existence of the uniform value (cf. Monderer and Sorin [9] or Lehrer and Monderer [4]).
For recursive games, the situation seems to be different. There are two results giving sufficient
conditions for a recursive game with countable state space to have a uniform value. The first
one can be derived from Rosenberg and Vieille [12]: if (vλ) converges uniformly to some function
v, then the recursive game has a uniform value, which is equal to v. The second one is due to
Solan and Vieille [14]: if, except on a finite subset, the limsup value1 is above a strictly positive
1The limsup value is the value of the game in which the global payoff to player 1 is the limsup of the stage
payoff stream.
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constant on the non-absorbing states, then the recursive game has a uniform value, which is
equal to the limsup value.
The main result of this paper is that the uniform convergence of the n-stage values is a sufficient
condition for the existence of the uniform value. In fact we prove a stronger result: for any
recursive game with countable state space, if the family {vn, n ≥ 1} is totally bounded for the
uniform norm, then the uniform value exists. Our proof follows the same idea as Solan and
Vieille [14] and we will use several of their results.
Our result together with the result of Rosenberg and Vieille [12] provides a uniform Tauberian
theorem for recursive games: (vn) converges uniformly if and only if (vλ) converges uniformly,
and in case of convergence, both limits are the same. For general stochastic games, Ziliotto [20]
provided recently a direct proof of this result.
Finally, we apply our main result to finite recursive games with signals. In a recursive game
with signals, players do not perfectly observe the state and actions at every stage anymore,
rather they receive a private signal. Mertens [6] conjectured that in a general model of zero-
sum repeated games, if player 1 (the maximizer) is always more informed than player 2 (the
minimizer) during the play (in the sense that player 2’s private signal can be deduced from
player 1’s private signal) then Maxmin = limn→∞ vn = limλ→0 vλ, i.e., both the uniform maxmin
and the asymptotic value exist and are equal.
Ziliotto [19] showed that the result is false in general. Nevertheless, several positive results
have been obtained for subclasses of games including Sorin [15] and Sorin [16] for Big match with
one-sided incomplete information, Rosenberg et al. [11], Renault [10] and Gensbittel et al. [3]
for a more informed controller, and Rosenberg and Vieille [12] for recursive games with one-sided
incomplete information.
We prove the Mertens conjecture in finite recursive games with signals, where player 1
is always more informed than player 2 during the play. The proof uses several results from
Gensbittel et al. [3], concerning the n-stage value functions in a repeated game where player 1
is more informed than player 2. Our result generalizes Rosenberg and Vieille [12], which deals
with the model where player 1 is informed of a private signal on the state at the beginning of
the game. Moreover, we deduce the existence of the uniform value in finite recursive games with
symmetric information.
The organization of the article is as follows: in Section 2 we introduce the model of recursive
games; in Section 3 we present the main result and several corollaries; Section 4 is dedicated to
the proofs; finally in Section 5 we apply the result to finite recursive games with signals.
2 Preliminaries: model and notations
Notation Given any metric space S, endowed with the Borelian σ-algebra, we denote by ∆(S)
the set of probabilities on S and we denote by ∆f(S) the set of probabilities with finite support.
2.1 The model
A two-player zero sum stochastic game Γ = ⟨X,A,B, g, q⟩ is given by
• a state space X.
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• player 1’s action set A, and for any x ∈ X, A(x) is a finite subset of A.
• player 2’s action set B, and for any x ∈ X, B(x) is a finite subset of B.
• a payoff function: g ∶ X ×A ×B → [−1,+1].
• a transition probability function: q: X ×A ×B →∆f(X).
Play of the game The stochastic game with initial state x1 ∈ X is denoted by Γ(x1), and is
played as follows: at each stage t ≥ 1, after observing (x1, a1, b1, ... ..., at−1, bt−1, xt), player 1 and
player 2 choose simultaneously actions at ∈ A(xt) and bt ∈ B(xt). The stage payoff is g(xt, at, bt)
and a new state xt+1 is drawn according to the probability distribution q(xt, at, bt). Both players
observe the action pair (at, bt) and the state xt+1. The game then proceeds to stage t + 1.
Note that we did not make any measurability assumption on the model. As the transition prob-
ability distribution is supposed to be finitely supported, given an initial state, the set of actions
and states that might appear in the infinite game are in fact countable. Therefore probability
distributions are well defined.
Recursive game Γ is a recursive game if there exist a set of active states denoted by X0 and
a set of absorbing states denoted by X∗ with X0 ∪X∗ =X and X0 ∩X∗ = ∅, such that:
• the stage payoff is 0 on active states: ∀x ∈ X0, g(x,a, b) = 0,∀(a, b) ∈ A(x) ×B(x);
• states in X∗ are absorbing: ∀x ∈ X∗, q(x,a, b)(x) = 1, ∀(a, b) ∈ A(x)×B(x), and g(x,a, b)
depends only on x.
2.2 Definition of strategies and evaluations
History At stage t, the space of finite histories isHt = (X×A×B)t−1×X. SetH∞ = (X×A×B)∞
to be the space of infinite plays. We consider the discrete topology on X, A and B. For every
t ≥ 1, we identify any ht ∈ Ht with a cylinder set in H∞ and denote by Ht the σ-field of Ht
induced on H∞. The product σ-field on H∞ is H∞ = σ(Ht, t ≥ 1).
Strategy A (behavior) strategy for player 1 is a sequence of functions σ = (σt)t≥1 with each
t ≥ 1, σt ∶ (Ht,Ht) → ∆(A) such that for every ht ∈ Ht, σt(ht)(A(xt)) = 1. If for every t ≥ 1
and ht ∈ Ht, there exists a ∈ A(xt) such that σt(ht)[a] = 1, then the strategy is pure. We define
similarly a behavior strategy τ for player 2. Denote by Σ and T respectively player 1’s and
player 2’s sets of behavior strategies. Denote by Σ̂ and T̂ respectively player 1’s and player 2’s
subsets of strategies that depend on the histories only through the states but not on the actions.
Evaluations Let us describe several ways to evaluate the payoff in Γ. By Kolmogorov’s ex-
tension theorem, any triple (x1, σ, τ) ∈ X ×Σ × T induces a unique probability distribution over(H∞,H∞) denoted by Px1,σ,τ . Let Ex1,σ,τ be the corresponding expectation.
n-stage average For each positive n ≥ 1, the expected average payoff up to stage n, induced by
the couple of strategies (σ, τ) and the initial state x1 is given by
γn(x1, σ, τ) = Ex1,σ,τ ( 1n
n
∑
t=1
g(xt, at, bt)) .
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The game with expected n-stage average payoff and initial state x1 is denoted as Γn(x1).
λ-discounted average For each λ ∈ (0,1], the expected λ-discounted average payoff, induced by
the couple of strategies (σ, τ) and the initial state x1 is given by
γλ(x1, σ, τ) = Ex1,σ,τ (λ
∞
∑
t=1
(1 − λ)(t−1)g(xt, at, bt)) .
The game with expected λ-discounted average payoff and initial state x1 is denoted as Γλ(x1).
In either Γn(x1) or Γλ(x1), player 1 maximizes the expected average payoff and player 2 min-
imizes it. For a fixed x1 the game Γn(x1) is finite, so there exists a value vn(x1) by minmax
theorem. The existence of the discounted value vλ(x1) is also standard, and we refer to Mertens
et al. [8] (Section VII.1.) for a general presentation.
2.3 Stopping time and concatenation of strategies
A function θ ∶ (H∞,H∞) → N is called a stopping time if the set {h ∈ H∞∣θ(h) = t} is Ht-
measurable for all t ≥ 1. Explicitly for any h,h′ ∈H∞ and n ≥ 1: if h and h′ coincide until stage
n and θ(h) = n then θ(h′) = n. Let θ and θ′ be two stopping times, we write θ ≤ θ′ if for every
h ∈H∞, θ(h) ≤ θ′(h).
Given a sequence of strategies (σ[ℓ])ℓ≥1 and a sequence of increasing stopping time (θℓ)ℓ≥1,
we define σ∗ ∶= σ[1]θ1σ[2]θ2 ⋅ ⋅⋅ as the concatenation of (σ[ℓ])ℓ≥1 along (θℓ)ℓ≥1. Given n ≥ t ≥ 1
and h ∈ H∞, let hn be the projection of h on Hn and htn be the history of h between stage t
and n. The strategy σ∗ is defined by σ∗n(hn) = σ[1]n (hn) if n < θ1(h); σ∗n(hn) = σ[m]n−θm−1(hθm−1n ) if
θm−1 ≤ n < θm. Informally, for every ℓ ≥ 1 at stage θℓ, the player forgets the past and starts to
play σℓ+1 at the current state.
2.4 Uniform value
Uniformly guarantee Player 1 uniformly guarantees w if for every ε > 0, there exists σε in Σ
and N0 ≥ 1 such that for every x1 ∈X0,
γn(x1, σε, τ) ≥ w(x1) − ε, ∀n ≥ N0, ∀τ ∈ T .
We say that the strategy σε uniformly guarantees w−ε. Similarly, player 2 uniformly guarantees
w if for every ε > 0, there exists τε in T and N0 ≥ 1 such that for every x1 ∈ X0,
γn(x1, σ, τε) ≤ w(x1) + ε, ∀n ≥ N0, ∀σ ∈ Σ.
Uniform value v∞ ∶ X → R is the uniform value of the game Γ if both players uniformly
guarantee v∞. A strategy for player 1 (resp. player 2) that uniformly guarantees v∞ − ε (resp.
v∞ + ε) is called uniform ε-optimal. If both players can uniformly guarantee v∞ with pure
strategies, Γ has a uniform value in pure strategies.
Remark 2.1 In defining the uniform value, we ask N0 to be independent of the initial state x1.
One direct consequence of the existence of the uniform value v∞ is the uniform convergence of(vn)n≥1 to v∞. This is stronger than the definition where the existence of the uniform value is
considered state by state (see for example Solan and Vieille [14], Definitions 3-4)
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3 Main results
In this section, we present the main result of the paper, namely Theorem 3.1, as well as several
corollaries. We also provide an example that does not satisfy the condition of Theorem 3.1 and
does not have a uniform value.
3.1 Sufficient condition for the existence of the uniform value
Denote by B(X) the set of functions from X to [−1,1] with the uniform norm ∥ ⋅ ∥∞. Recall
that a set of functions F in (B(X), ∥.∥∞) is totally bounded if for every ε > 0, there exists a finite
subset FR = {fr ∶ 1 ≤ r ≤ R} ⊆ F such that for any f ∈ F , there is fr ∈ FR with ∣∣f − fr∣∣∞ ≤ ε.
Theorem 3.1 Suppose that the space {vn, n ≥ 1} is totally bounded for the uniform norm, then
the recursive game Γ has a uniform value v∞. Moreover both players can uniformly guarantee
v∞ with strategies that depend only on the history of states and not on past actions.
We deduce from the previous result a uniform Tauberian theorem in recursive games.
Corollary 3.2 The sequence of n-stage values (vn)n≥1 converges uniformly as n tends to infinity
if and only if the sequence of λ-discounted values (vλ)λ∈(0,1] converges uniformly as λ tends to
zero. In case of convergence, both limits are the same.
On one hand, if (vn) converges uniformly, the family is totally bounded, thus the uniform value
exists, and this implies the uniform convergence of (vλ) (Sorin [17], Lemma 3.1). On the other
hand, the converse result is established in Rosenberg and Vieille [12] (see Remark 6, Theorem 1
and Theorem 3).
Remark 3.3 The equivalence of the uniform convergences of (vn)n≥1 and (vλ)λ∈(0,1] has been
proven in MDP by Lehrer and Sorin [5]. Ziliotto [20] recently showed that it is also true for
stochastic games whenever the Shapley operator is well defined.
If, in addition, for every n ≥ 1 the n-stage value vn(x) exists in pure strategies, then Γ has a
uniform value in pure strategies.
Corollary 3.4 Suppose that for every n ≥ 1, both players have pure optimal strategies in the
n-stage game, and {vn, n ≥ 1} is totally bounded for the uniform norm. Then Γ has a uniform
value v∞ in pure strategies. Moreover, both players can uniformly guarantee v∞ with strategies
that depend only on the history of states and not on past actions.
Remark 3.5 The result in Corollary 3.4 extends to games with general action sets A(x) and
B(x) provided that for any n ≥ 1, the n-stage game has a value and both players have pure
optimal strategies.
The proof of Corollary 3.4 is similar to that of Theorem 3.1. The key difference involves a
technical lemma (Lemma 4.18) for the existence of a (pure) stopping time which is used in the
definition of players’ optimal strategies (see the proof of Proposition 4.3). We discuss this point
and present the proof in Subsection 4.3.
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3.2 A recursive game without uniform value
We present here an example of a recursive game with countable state space where {vn, n ≥ 1} is
not totally bounded and there is no uniform value (See Figure 3.2 below for illustration). This
is an adaptation to our framework of an example in Lehrer and Sorin [5].
The state space is a subset of Z×Z. The set of active states is X0 = {(x, y) ∈ N×N ∣0 ≤ y ≤ x}
and the set of absorbing states is X∗ = X∗
1 ⋃X∗−2 (two types), where X∗1 = N × {−1} and X∗−2 ={(x,x+1)∣x ≥ 0}. The payoff is 1 on X∗
1
and is −2 on X∗−2. There is only one player (maximizer),
whose action set is {R(ight), J(ump)}. The transition rule is given by:
• at (x,0) ∈ X0: q((x,0),R)(x + 1,0) = 1, and q((x,0), J)(x,−1) = q((x,0), J)(x,1) = 1
2
;
• at (x, y) ∈X0 with 0 < y ≤ x: q((x, y), a)(x, y + 1) = 1, ∀a ∈ {R,J}.
Starting at (0,0), one optimal strategy for an n-stage game is to go Right for half of the game,
and then to Jump. This gives an expected average payoff around 1
4
, thus limn→∞ vn(0,0) = 14 .
In a λ-discounted game, the optimal stage to Jump is approximately
ln( 2−λ
4
)
ln(1−λ) . It follows that
vλ(0,0) ≈ 2−λ16 and thus limλ→0 vλ(0,0) = 18 . This implies that there is no uniform value. On the
other hand, {vn, n ≥ 1} is not totally bounded for the uniform norm. Indeed, the convergence of(vn) is not uniform: for any x ≥ 1, limn→∞ vn(x,1) = −2 while vx(x,1) = 0.
(0,0)
(n,n + 1)
(n,−1)
x
y
X∗1
X∗−2
(n,0)
(n,n)
The figure on the left illustrates
a play (R, ...,R,J) jumping after
n steps: with probability 1/2 the
state is absorbed at (n,n+1) ∈ X∗−2;
with probability 1/2 the state is
absorbed at (n,−1) ∈ X∗
1
.
Ð→ : a deterministic transition;
−⇢: a probabilistic transition.
Figure 3.2
4 Proofs
In the first subsection, we introduce and establish preliminary results for a subclass of recursive
game, which will be called positive-valued recursive games . In the second subsection, we prove
Theorem 3.1 by a reduction of any recursive game to a positive-valued recursive game. The proof
for Corollary 3.4 is given in the third subsection.
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4.1 The case of positive-valued recursive game
Definition 4.1 A recursive game is positive-valued if there exist M > 0 and n0 ≥ 1 such that
for every non-absorbing state x ∈X0, there exists n(x) ≤ n0 such that vn(x)(x) ≥M .
In order to state the next proposition, we first introduce the notion of uniformly terminating
strategy.
Definition 4.2 Denote by ρ the stopping time of absorption in X∗: ρ = inf{n ≥ 1, xn ∈ X∗}.
The strategy σ is said to be uniformly terminating if for any ε > 0, there exists N ≥ 1 such that
for every x1 ∈ X0 and for every τ ∈ T , Px1,σ,τ(ρ ≤ N) ≥ 1 − ε.
Proposition 4.3 Let Γ be a positive-valued recursive game. We fix the numbers M > 0, n0 ≥ 1
and the mapping n(⋅) ∶ X0 Ð→ {1, ..., n0} such that vn(x)(x) ≥M,∀x ∈ X0.
Then player 1 uniformly guarantees vn(⋅)(⋅) with uniformly terminating strategies that depends
only on states: for all ε > 0, there exists σ∗ in Σ̂ and N0 ≥ 1 such that for every x1 ∈ X0 and
every τ in T ,
(i) Px1,σ∗,τ(ρ ≤ N0) ≥ 1 − ε and (ii) γn(x1, σ∗, τ) ≥ vn(x1)(x1) − ε, ∀n ≥ N0.
Proof. Let σˆ be a profile of strategies such that for every x ∈ X0, σˆ(x) is optimal in the
n(x)-stage game Γn(x)(x). Let k˜ ∶= k˜(x) be a random stage uniformly chosen in {1, ..., n(x)}.
For any τ ∈ T and x ∈X0, (x, σˆ, τ) and k˜ induce a probability distribution over H∞×{1, ...n(x)},
which we denote by P̃x,σˆ,τ . Let Ẽx,σˆ,τ be the corresponding expectation. We obtain:
Ẽx,σˆ,τ [g(xk˜)] = Ex,σˆ,τ[ 1n(x)
n(x)
∑
l=1
g(xt)] ≥ inf
τ ′
Ex,σˆ,τ ′[ 1
n(x)
n(x)
∑
l=1
g(xt)] ≥ vn(x)(x) ≥M.
It follows that
Ẽx,σˆ,τ [g(xk˜)1ρ≤k˜ + g(xk˜)1ρ>k˜] ≥M.
On the event {ρ > k˜}, g(x
k˜
) = 0, whereas on the event {ρ ≤ k˜}, we have g(x
k˜
) = g(xρ). This
implies that
P̃x,σˆ,τ(ρ ≤ k˜)Ẽx,σˆ,τ [g(xρ) ∣ ρ ≤ k˜] = Ẽx,σˆ,τ [g (xk˜)] ≥ vn(x)(x) ≥M. (4.1)
Using the fact that the payoff function g has maximal norm 1, we deduce from (4.1):
P̃x,σˆ,τ(ρ ≤ k˜) ≥M. (4.2)
Define the strategy 2 σ∗ as concatenations of (σˆ(xul))l≥0 at the random stages (uℓ)ℓ≥0, where uℓ is
defined inductively along the play by u0 = 1 and uℓ+1−uℓ = k˜(xuℓ) follows the uniform distribution
over {1, ..., n(xℓ)}. Let P̃x,σ∗,τ be the (product) probability distribution over H∞ × {1, ..., n0}N
induced by (x,σ∗, τ), and Ẽx,σ∗,τ the corresponding expectation. Let ε > 0.(i) We show that σ∗ is uniformly terminating. By (4.2), the conditional probability of absorbing
on each block {ul−1, ..., ul − 1} is no smaller than M . Thus for any τ and x1 ∈X0,
P̃x1,σ∗,τ (ρ ≥ ul) ≤ (1 −M)l, ∀l ≥ 1.
2The strategy σ∗ is a generalized mixed strategy, which is equivalent to a behavior strategy by Kuhn’s theorem.
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The length of each block is uniformly bounded by n0, thus if we put l
∗ ≥ ln(ε)
ln(1−M) :
P̃x1,σ∗,τ (ρ ≤ n0l∗) ≥ P̃x1,σ∗,τ (ρ ≤ ul∗) ≥ 1 − (1 −M)l∗ ≥ 1 − ε. (4.3)
(ii) We now argue that σ∗ uniformly guarantees vn(x1)(x1) − 3ε. Let N0 = n0l∗/ε. For any
τ ∈ T , x1 ∈ X0 and n ≥ n0l∗, we have
Ex1,σ∗,τ [g (xn)] = Ẽx1,σ∗,τ
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣
ℓ∗−1
∑
l=0
g(xn)1ul≤ρ<ul+1 + g(xn)1uℓ∗≤ρ
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦
=
ℓ∗−1
∑
l=0
P̃x1,σ∗,τ(ul ≤ ρ < ul+1)Ẽx1,σ∗,τ [g(xρ)∣ul ≤ ρ < ul+1]
+ P̃x1,σ∗,τ(ul∗ ≤ ρ)Ẽx1,σ∗,τ [g(xn)∣ρ ≥ ul∗] .
According to (4.3), Px1,σ∗,τ(ρ ≥ ul∗) ≤ ε, thus we focus on an absorption before uℓ∗ :
Ex1,σ∗,τ [g(xn)] ≥
l∗−1
∑
l=0
P̃x1,σ∗,τ(ul ≤ ρ < ul+1)Ẽx1,σ∗,τ [g(xρ)∣ul ≤ ρ < ul+1] − ε (4.4)
For each l ≥ 0, σ∗ is following σˆ(xul) for ul+1 − ul = k˜(xuℓ) stages. Thus (4.1) applies, and we
obtain: for ℓ ≥ 1,
P̃x1,σ∗,τ(ul ≤ ρ < ul+1)Ẽx1,σ∗,τ [g(xρ)∣ul ≤ ρ < ul+1] ≥ P̃x1,σ∗,τ(ρ > uℓ)M > 0,
and for l = 0,
P̃x1,σ∗,τ(1 ≤ ρ < u1)Ẽx1,σ∗,τ [g(xρ)∣1 ≤ ρ < u1] ≥ vn(x1)(x1).
By substituting the two previous inequalities into (4.4), we obtain that
∀n ≥ n0l
∗,∀x1 ∈ X
0, Ex1,σ∗,τ [g(xn)] ≥ vn(x1)(x1) − ε. (4.5)
Now for n ≥ N0, we deduce that γn(x1, σ∗, τ) ≥ vn(x1)(x1) − 3ε.
One can deduce from Proposition 4.3 a first result on recursive games with the condition that
the sequence of n-stage values converges uniformly to a function bounded away from 0.
Corollary 4.4 Assume that in a recursive game Γ, the sequence of n-stage values (vn)n≥1 con-
verges uniformly to a function v satisfying for every x ∈ X0, v(x) ≥M ′ > 0 for some M ′. Then
Γ is positive-valued and player 1 uniformly guarantees v with uniformly terminating strategies.
4.2 Existence of the uniform value (proof of Theorem 3.1)
This subsection is devoted to the proof of Theorem 3.1: the total boundedness of {vn, n ≥ 1}
implies the existence of the uniform value v∞. We prove that player 1 guarantees the point-wise
limit superior value x ↦ v(x) ∶= lim supn vn(x). By symmetry, player 2 guarantees lim infn vn(x),
and the result follows.
The uniform ε-optimal strategy will use alternatively two different types of strategies. This
approach is classical for recursive games and has been used for example in Rosenberg and Vieille
9
[12] and in Solan and Vieille [14]. Our construction is close to Solan and Vieille [14] in which
some similar "positive-valued recursive game" is introduced to make a reduction for the general
case.
The proof is decomposed into three parts. In the first one, we introduce a family of auxiliary
positive-valued recursive games and define the first type of strategies. In the second part, we
define the second type of strategies. Finally, we construct the strategy σ∗ and prove that it is
uniform ε-optimal.
Before proceeding to the proof, let us first prove a preliminary result, which shows that due
to the total boundedness of {vn}, the point-wise limit superior of (vn) can be realized along
uniform convergent subsequences. We fix a recursive game Γ for the rest of this section.
Proposition 4.5 For every x ∈X, we have
v(x) = lim sup
n
vn(x) =max
f∈F
f(x),
where F is the set of limit points of the sequence (vn)n≥1 in (B(X), ∥.∥∞).
Proof. (B(X), ∥.∥∞) is a complete metric space and ({vn}, ∥ ⋅ ∥∞) is totally bounded, therefore
F is compact and non-empty. For every x ∈ X, we denote w(x) ∶= maxf∈F f(x). Fix x ∈ X.
Since v(x) is the largest limit point of (vn(x))n≥1, we have w(x) ≤ v(x). By definition of the
limit superior, there exists a subsequence (vnk(x))k≥1 which converges to lim sup vn(x). There
exists a subsequence of (vnk)k≥1 that converges in (B(X), ∥.∥∞) to some f∗ ∈ F , therefore
max
f∈F
f(x) ≥ f∗(x) = v(x).
4.2.1 Reduction: auxiliary recursive games
Auxiliary recursive games Let θ ∶ X → {0,1}. We define the auxiliary recursive game
Γθ = ⟨A,B,X = X0θ ⋃X∗θ , qθ, gθ⟩ where any active state x ∈ X0 such that θ(x) = 1 is seen as an
absorbing state: the active state space of Γθ is X0θ = {x ∈ X0, θ(x) = 0} and the absorbing state
space is X∗θ = X
∗⋃{x ∈ X0, θ(x) = 1}. The transition qθ is equal to q and the payoff gθ is equal
to g on all states except {x ∈ X0, θ(x) = 1}, on which the state is absorbing and the absorbing
payoff is gθ = v. For every n ≥ 1, let vθn be the value of the n-stage auxiliary game Γ
θ
n.
Proposition 4.6 Let η > 0 and θ ∶ X → {0,1}. There exists n0 ≥ 1 such that for every x1 ∈ X0θ ,
there exists n(x1) ≤ n0 with vθn(x1)(x1) ≥ v(x1) − 4η.
Proof. Let η > 0 be fixed and FR = {f1, ..., fR} ⊆ F be a finite cover of size η2 of the set F . As{vn, n ≥ 1} is totally bounded, there exists some stage n(η) ∈ N, after which any n-stage value
vn is
η
2
-close to F its set of accumulation points, hence η-close to FR:
∃n(η) ∈ N, ∀n ≥ n(η), ∃fr ∈ {f1, ..., fR}, s.t. ∣∣vn − fr∣∣∞ ≤ η; (4.6)
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Moreover for every r ∈ {1, ..,R}, fr is an accumulation point of {vn, n ≥ 1}, therefore there exists
some nr >
n(η)
η
such that vnr is η-close to fr:
∀fr ∈ FR, ∃nr >
n(η)
η
, s.t. ∣∣vnr − fr∣∣∞ ≤ η. (4.7)
Finally we take n0 =max{nr ∶ 1 ≤ r ≤ R}. The integers nr are chosen such that when absorption
in X∗θ occurs in the game of length nr the remaining number of stages is either a fraction smaller
than η of the total length of the game or greater than n(η) and Equations (4.6) applies.
Let x1 ∈ X0θ be any non-absorbing state in the auxiliary game Γ
θ. By compactness of F ,
there exists f ∈ F such that f(x1) = v(x1) and fr ∈ FR with ∣∣f − fr∣∣∞ ≤ η2 . In particular at state
x1,
fr(x1) ≥ f(x1) − η
2
= v(x1) − η
2
,
which together with (4.7) implies that
vnr(x1) ≥ fr(x1) − η ≥ v(x1) − 3
2
η. (4.8)
We now prove that
vθnr(x1) ≥ vnr(x1) − 2η. (4.9)
Denote by
ρθ = inf
t≥1
{xt ∈X∗θ } = inf
t≥1
{xt ∈ X∗ or θ(xt) = 1}
the stopping time associated to absorption in Γθ, and set ρnr
θ
= min(ρθ, nr). An adaptation of
standard proof technique of the Shapley equation gives us:
vnr(x1) =max
σ∈Σ
min
τ∈T
Ex1,σ,τ
⎛
⎝
1
nr
⎛
⎝
ρ
nr
θ
−1
∑
t=1
g(xt)⎞⎠ +
nr − ρ
nr
θ
+ 1
nr
vnr−ρnrθ +1
(xρnr
θ
)⎞⎠ .
We separate the histories into two sets depending on whether nr − ρ
nr
θ
(h) + 1 > n(η) in which
cases Equation (4.6) applies, or nr−ρ
nr
θ
(h)+1 ≤ n(η) in which cases nr−ρnrθ (h)+1
nr
≤ η (by definition
nr ≥
n(η)
η
), and deduce that
vnr(x1) ≤max
σ∈Σ
min
τ∈T
Ex1,σ,τ
⎛
⎝
1
nr
ρ
nr
θ
−1
∑
t=1
g(xt) + nr − ρ
nr
θ
+ 1
nr
f ′h(xρnr
θ
)⎞⎠ + 2η,
with f ′h ∈ FR depending on the history given by Equation (4.6) applied to vnr−ρnrθ +1 when nr −
ρnr
θ
+ 1 > n(η), and any function in Fr otherwise. Therefore, by considering v as the supremum
of f ∈ F at each point xρnr
θ
∈ X, we have f ′h(xρnrθ ) ≤ v(xρnrθ ), thus
vnr(x1) ≤max
σ∈Σ
min
τ∈T
Ex1,σ,τ
⎛
⎝
1
nr
ρ
nr
θ
−1
∑
t=1
g(xt) + nr − ρ
nr
θ
+ 1
nr
v(xρnr
θ
)⎞⎠ + 2η
= vθnr(x1) + 2η.
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This proves inequality (4.9). We now use Equation (4.8) and Equation (4.9) to conclude:
vθnr(x1) ≥ v(x1) − 4η.
It means that for each x1 ∈ X0θ , there exists n(x1) ∶= nr ≤ n0 = max{nr ∶ 1 ≤ r ≤ R}, such that
vθ
n(x1)(x1) ≥ v(x1) − 4η. .
Remark 4.7 Proposition 4.6 is also true if θ is a deterministic stopping time and not only a
function on the state. The auxiliary game would be defined on a larger state space: the set of
finite histories of the original game. The proof in itself is similar.
Fix now any ε > 0 and define θε ∶X → {0,1} such that {x ∈ X, θε(x) = 1} = {x ∈ X,v(x) < ε}.
We denote by Γε = ⟨A,B,X =X0ε ⋃X∗ε , qε, gε⟩ the auxiliary game associated to Γ defined by the
stopping time θε.
Corollary 4.8 In the game Γε, Player 1 uniformly guarantees v with uniformly terminating
strategies that depend only on past states.
Proof. Let η ∈ (0, ε/8], by Proposition 4.6 there exists n0 ≥ 1 such that for every x1 ∈ X0ε , there
exists n(x1) ≤ n0 with
vεn(x1)(x1) ≥ v(x1) − 4η ≥ ε/2, (4.10)
where the second inequality comes from the definition of X0ε . Therefore, Γ
ε is a positive-valued
recursive game and by Proposition 4.3, player 1 uniformly guarantees vε
n(⋅)(⋅) with uniformly ter-
minating strategies in Σ̂. By Equation (4.10), it follows that for every η > 0, player 1 uniformly
guarantees v − 4η with uniformly terminating strategies.
Fix now a strategy σ∗ε that is uniformly terminating in Γ
ε, depends only on past states and
guarantees v(x1) − ε2 in Γε(x1) for every x1 ∈ X0ε .
4.2.2 One-shot game
One-shot game Gf For each f ∶X → [−1,+1] and x1 ∈ X, we define the one-shot game Gf as
follows: player 1’s action set is A(x1), player 2’s action set is B(x1), and the payoff is for each(s, t) ∈∆(A) ×∆ (B),
Eq(x1,s,t)[f(x2)] = ∑
a∈A,b∈B
s(a)t(b)⎛⎝ ∑x2∈X q(x1, a, b)(x2)f(x2)
⎞
⎠ .
Lemma 4.9 For any limit point f ∈ F , the one-shot game Gf has a value equal to f .
Proof. Let n ≥ 1, it is known that (cf. Vigeral [18] p.40, Lemma 4.2.2)
∥vn − vn+1∥∞ ≤ 2
n + 1
,
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and by Shapley’s formula that
vn+1(x1) = sup
s∈∆(A(x1))
inf
t∈∆(B(x1))
Eq(x1,s,t) [ 1n + 1g(x1) +
n
n + 1
vn(x2)]
= inf
t∈∆(B(x1))
sup
s∈∆(A(x1))
Eq(x1,s,t) [ 1n + 1g(x1) +
n
n + 1
vn(x2)] .
We obtain the result by taking the limit along a subsequence converging uniformly to f ∈ F .
Following Proposition 4.5, one can take for each x ∈ X some f∗ ∈ F such that v(x) = f∗(x) ≥
f(x),∀f ∈ F . Then the following result is a direct consequence of Lemma 4.9 .
Corollary 4.10 For every x1 ∈ X, there exists s∗(x1) ∈∆(A(x1)) such that
∀b ∈ B(x1), Eq(x1,s∗(x1),b) [v(x2)] ≥ v(x1).
Fix now s∗ ∶= (s∗(x1))x1∈X a profile of strategies satisfying the conclusion of Corollary 4.10.
4.2.3 Optimal strategy
Roughly speaking, we build σ¯ a uniform ε-optimal strategy for player 1 to play σ∗ε in Γ
ε on the
states with value v above 2ε, and to play s∗ in Gv on the states with value v below ε. And for
the states with value v between ε and 2ε, σ¯ will be either of the two depending on the regime.
Construction of σ¯ Define a sequence of stopping times (ul)l≥1 and the concatenated strategy
σ ∶= s∗u1σ∗εu2s
∗u3σ
∗
εu4 ⋅ ⋅⋅ in Γ as follows:
• σ is to play s∗(xn) at each stage n up to stage (not included)
u1 = inf{n ≥ 1, v(xn) > 2ε};
and then to play σ∗ε (xu1) up to stage (not included)
u2 = inf{n ≥ u1, v(xn) < ε}.
• In general: for each r ≥ 1, σ is to play σ∗ε (xu2r−1) from stage u2r−1 (the odd phase) up to
stage (not included)
u2r = inf{n ≥ u2r−1, v(xn) < ε}.
and then to play s∗(xn) at each stage n ≥ u2r (the even phase), up to stage (not included)
u2r+1 = inf{n ≥ u2r, v(xn) > 2ε}.
Remark 4.11 The idea of alternating between two types of strategies is common in Rosenberg
and Vieille [12], Solan and Vieille [14] and this article. The main difference is the definition
of the target function v used to define how to switch from one type of strategies to the other.
Rosenberg and Vieille [12] use the limit of discounted values and σ∗ε is an optimal strategy in
some λ-discounted game (for λ close to zero). Solan and Vieille [14] use the limsup value and
introduce an auxiliary positive-valued game. We adopt a similar approach to Solan and Vieille
[14] but with v the largest limit point of (vn).
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By construction, σ¯ depends on the histories only through the states and not the actions. Let
us show that σ¯ uniformly guarantees v−25ε for player 1, which finishes the proof of Theorem 3.1.
Fix from now on any x1 ∈X. Recall that ρ denotes the absorption time in the game Γ. The
next result shows that the process (v(xmin(ρ,ul)))l≥1, which is the value of v at switching times(ul), is almost a submartingale up to an error of ε2.
Proposition 4.12 For every l ≥ 1 and every τ ∈ T :
Ex1,σ,τ [v(xmin(ρ,ul+1))∣Hmin(ρ,ul)] ≥ v(xmin(ρ,ul)) − ε21ρ>ul,
on the event min(ρ,ul) < +∞.
Proof. Take any τ in T . The result is true if ρ ≤ ul. Suppose that l is even and ρ > ul: by
construction the strategy (s∗(xn)) is used during the phrase n ∈ {ul, ..., ul+1 − 1}, thus:
Ex1,σ,τ [v(xn+1)∣Hn] ≥ v(xn), for all ul ≤ n <min(ρ,ul+1).
Therefore (v(xn)) is a bounded submartingale and by Doob’s stopping theorem,
Ex1,σ,τ [v(xmin(ρ,ul+1))∣Hmin(ρ,ul)] ≥ v(xmin(ρ,ul)).
Suppose that l is odd and ρ > ul. By construction, player 1 is using σ∗ε (xul), which uniformly
guarantees v(xul) − ε2 in the auxiliary game Γε(xul):
∃N0 ≥ 1, Ex1,σ¯,τ
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1
n
ul+n
∑
t=ul+1
gε(xt)∣Hul
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
≥ v(xul) − ε2 for all n ≥ N0. (4.11)
Denote by ρε = min{m ≥ ul + 1 ∶ xm ∈ X∗ε } the absorption time in Γε(xul). Since in recursive
games the payoff is zero before absorption, we have
Ex1,σ¯,τ [gε(xρε)∣Hul] = Ex1,σ¯,τ
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
lim
n→∞
1
n
ul+n
∑
t=ul+1
gε(xt)∣Hul
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
. (4.12)
By the dominated convergence theorem,
Ex1,σ¯,τ
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
lim
n→∞
1
n
ul+n
∑
t=ul+1
gε(xt)∣Hul
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
= lim
n→∞
Ex1,σ¯,τ
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1
n
ul+n
∑
t=ul+1
gε(xt)∣Hul
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
. (4.13)
We deduce from (4.11)-(4.13) that
Ex1,σ¯,τ [gε(xρε)∣Hul] ≥ v(xul) − ε2.
Moreover, gε(xρε) = v(xρε) and conditionally on ρ > ul, ρε =min(ul+1, ρ). It follows that
Ex1,σ,τ [v(xmin(ρ,ul+1))∣Hul] ≥ v(xul) − ε2.
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Due to the possible error term ε2, the sequence (v(xmin(ρ,ul)))l≥1 is not a submartingale. Never-
theless, one can prove a lemma similar to the usual upcrossing lemma for submartingale. Indeed,
the value is a martingale excepts if it crosses upwards the interval [ε,2ε]. When this happens, the
value may decreases of at most ε2. With the submartingale property established in Proposition
4.12, an easy adaptation of the standard result on upcrossing number of submartingale implies
the following result, as was shown in Proposition 3 of Rosenberg and Vieille [12]:
Lemma 4.13 Let N = sup{p ≥ 1 ∶ u2p−1 < +∞} be the number of times the process (v(xul))
crosses upward the interval [ε,2ε].For every τ ∈ T ,
Ex1,σ,τ [N] ≤ 1ε − ε2 .
By construction, σ∗ε is uniformly terminating within the auxiliary absorbing states X
∗
ε . That
is to say, any play between stages u2p−1 and u2p (on an odd phase) has bounded length with
high probability under the strategy σ∗ε (xu2p−1), uniformly over any starting state xu2p−1 ∈ X0ε .
Since Lemma 4.13 implies that the number of odd phases is bounded in expectations, the total
frequency of stages on all odd phases is negligible for n large. Let us formalize this fact.
Recall that ρε denotes the absorption time in the auxiliary game Γε. It follows that there
exists N1 > 0 such that
∀x ∈ X0ε and τ ∈ T ∶ Px,σ∗ε(x),τ(ρε > N1) ≤ ε3. (4.14)
For each n ∈ N, define An = {u2p−1 ≤ n < min(ρ,u2p), u2p−1 < ρ, for some p} ⊆ H∞. These are all
infinite plays where stage n is in an odd phrase, i.e., the stages between u2p−1 and u2p on which
σ∗ε (xu2p−1) is used. We fix for the rest of subsection the uniform stage number N1 satisfying
(4.14).
Lemma 4.14 For every τ ∈ T and every n ≥ N1
ε3
,
1
n
n
∑
k=1
Px1,σ(x1),τ(Ak) ≤ 5ε.
The proof for this lemma relies on the upcrossing property established in Lemma 4.13, and
takes the same form as Lemma 27 in Solan and Vieille [14]. Solan and Veille [14] make some
finiteness assumption (on the set of non-absorbing states on which the target function is not
bounded away from zero) in order to obtain the existence of X1ε a subset of X
0
ε and a uniform
bound N1 ≥ 1 such that
∀x ∈ X1ε and τ ∈ T ∶ Px,σ∗ε(x),τ(ρε > N1) ≤ ε3.
Under the assumption that {vn, n ≥ 1} is totally bounded, we showed in Section 4.2.1 (cf. the
condition defined in (4.14)) that we can consider X1ε to be the whole set X0ε .
The following result is a reformulation of the submartingale property in Lemma 4.12.
Lemma 4.15 For any m0 ≥ 1, we have
Ex1,σ,τ [v(xm0)] ≥ v(x1) − ε2 ⋅Ex1,σ,τ [N] − 2Px1,σ,τ(Am0) − ε.
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Proof. For a proof, we refer to Proposition 28 in Solan and Vieille [14], where our lemma is
stated as Equation (4) in their proof.
Now we use Lemma 4.13, Lemma 4.14 and Lemma 4.15 to prove the following proposition,
which concludes the proof of Theorem 3.1.
Proposition 4.16 For any x1 ∈ X0 and for any τ ,
Ex1,σ¯,τ [ 1n
n
∑
m=1
g(xm)] ≥ v(x1) − 25ε, ∀n ≥ N1
ε3
.
Proof. Take x1 ∈ X0 and fix any τ . In this proof h will denote a pure play. We use the fact
that g(xm) ≥ v(xm) − 2ε if h ∉ Am: indeed, either the play has absorbed so g(xm) = v(xm), or
we have v(xm) < 2ε and g(xm) = 0. Moreover, if h ∈ Am, we use g(xm) ≥ −1. This gives us:
Ex1,σ,τ [ 1n
n
∑
m=1
g(xm)] ≥ 1
n
Ex1,σ,τ [
n
∑
m=1
1h∉Am(v(xm) − 2ε) +
n
∑
m=1
1h∈Am(−1)]
≥
1
n
Ex1,σ,τ [
n
∑
m=1
v(xm)] + 1
n
Ex1,σ,τ [
n
∑
m=1
1h∈Am( − 1 − (v(xm) − 2ε))] − 2ε.
(4.15)
Lemma 4.15 (taking average sum on m0 = 1, ..., n) implies that
1
n
Ex1,σ,τ [
n
∑
m=1
v(xm)] ≥ v(x1) − ε2 ⋅Ex1,σ,τ [N] − 2n
n
∑
m=1
Px1,σ,τ(Am) − ε. (4.16)
Moreover, the bound v(xm) ≤ 1 gives
1
n
Ex1,σ,τ [
n
∑
m=1
1h∈Am( − 1 − v(xm) + 2ε)] ≥ 1nEx1,σ,τ [
n
∑
m=1
1h∈Am(−2 + 2ε)]
= (−2 + 2ε) 1
n
n
∑
m=1
Px1,σ,τ(Am).
(4.17)
We substitute (4.16) and (4.17) back into (4.15) to obtain
Ex1,σ,τ [ 1n
n
∑
m=1
g(xm)] ≥ v(x1) − ε2 ⋅Ex1,σ,τ [N] − 3ε + (−4 + 2ε) ⋅ ( 1n
n
∑
m=1
Px1,σ,τ(Am)) .
Finally, we use Lemma 4.13 and Lemma 4.14 in the equality to have that: ∀n ≥ N1
ε3
and ∀ε ≤ 1
2
,
Ex1,σ,τ [ 1n
n
∑
m=1
g(xm)] ≥ v(x1) − ε2
ε − ε2
− 3ε − 20ε ≥ v(x1) − 25ε.
note that N1 does not depend on the particular choice of x1 in X
0, so the strategy σ uniformly
guarantees v − 25ε in the infinite game Γ.
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4.3 Pure optimal strategy (proof of Corollary 3.4)
To prove the result, it is sufficient to show that both the strategy s∗ and the strategy σ∗ε defined
in the proof of Theorem 3.1 can be chosen pure and depending only on the history of states.
By assumption, the n-stage game Γn(x) has a value in pure strategies. It follows that
Shapley’s equation for any vn is satisfied with pure strategies, and so is Lemma 4.9. We deduce
that there exists a pure action s∗ that satisfies the conclusion of Corollary 4.10.
The construction of the strategy σ∗ε appeared in the proof of Proposition 4.2, where it was
defined as the concatenation of a sequence of strategies (σˆ(xuℓ))ℓ≥1 at the random stages (uℓ)ℓ≥1.
As each σˆ(x) is optimal in the n(x)-stage game Γn(x)(x), σˆ(xuℓ) can be taken pure. The defi-
nition of the random stages uℓ involved a randomized stopping time k˜ ∈ {1, ..., n(x)} satisfying:
∀τ ∈ T , Ẽx,σˆ,τ [g(xk˜)] ≥minτ ′∈T Ex,σˆ,τ ′[
1
n(x)
n(x)
∑
t=1
g(xt)].
To obtain a pure strategy σ∗ε , we show that the random stopping time k˜ can be replaced by a
stopping time (pure one), which depends only on the history of states and not on the actions. In
order to build this stopping time, we restrict ourselves to strategies in Σ̂ , i.e., strategies which
depend only on past states. Note that each σˆ(xuℓ), as an optimal strategy in Γn(xuℓ)(xuℓ), can
be taken in Σ̂.
Lemma 4.17 Fix any σˆ ∈ Σ̂ and x1. For any τ ∈ T , there exists some τˆ ∈ T̂ such that
Px1,σˆ,τˆ(x1, ..., xt) = Px1,σˆ,τ(x1, ..., xt) for any (x1, ..., xt) ∈Xt, t ≥ 1.
Proof. For all t ≥ 1, we denote by st ∶= (x1, ..., xt) the t first states. For any τ ∈ T , define the
reduced strategy τˆ ∈ T̂ as:
τˆt(st) = ∑
ht∈Ht(st)
Px1,σˆ,τ(ht∣st)τt(ht), ∀st, ∀t ≥ 1.
where Ht(st) denotes the histories in Ht containing st. Then we obtain by definition:
Px1,σˆ,τˆ(st+1) = ∑
ht∈Ht(st)
Px1,σˆ,τ(ht∣st)Px1,σˆ,τ(st+1∣ht) = Px1,σˆ,τ(st+1).
Lemma 4.18 Fix any x1 ∈ X0 and σ ∈ Σ̂. For any n ≥ 1, there exists a stopping time θ ∶
⋃1≤t≤nXt → {1, ..., n} such that for every strategy τ of player 2:
Ex1,σ,τ [g(xθ)] ≥min
τ ′
Ex1,σ,τ ′ [ 1n
n
∑
t=1
g(xt)] .
Proof. By Lemma 4.17, we can assume that τ ∈ T̂ . Let us prove the result by induction. For
every x1 ∈ X0, the result is true for n = 1. Suppose that the claim is true for n − 1. Let x1 ∈ X0.
By applying the inductive assumption to the different states possible at stage 2, we obtain that
there is some stopping time θ+ ∶ ⋃n−1t=1 Xt → {2, ..., n} such that
Ex1,σ,τ [g(xθ+)∣x2] ≥min
τ ′
Ex1,σ,τ ′[ 1n − 1
n
∑
t=2
g(xt)∣x2] ∶= wn−1(σ,x1, x2). (4.18)
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Denote wn−1(σ,x1) = inf
y∈∆(J)
Ex1,σ,y[wn−1(σ,x1, x2)]. We define the stopping time θ ∶ ⋃nt=1Xt →
{1, ..., n} by
∀(x1, .., xt) ∈ Xt, θ(x1, ..., xt) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
1 if 0 ≥ wn−1(σ,x1),
θ+(x2, ..., xt) otherwise.
According to the definition of θ and the inductive assumption (4.18) for θ+:
Ex1,σ,τ [g(xθ)] = g(x1)10≥wn−1(σ,x1) + Ex1,σ,τ [Ex1,σ,τ [g(xθ+)∣x2]]10<wn−1(σ,x1)
≥max {0,wn−1(σ,x1)}
≥
n − 1
n
wn−1(σ,x1).
Finally g(x1) = 0, therefore
n − 1
n
wn−1(σ,x1) = (n − 1
n
) inf
τ ′
Ex1,σ,τ ′ [ 1n − 1
n−1
∑
t=2
g(xt)] =min
τ ′
Ex1,σ,τ ′ [ 1n
n
∑
t=1
g(xt)] .
This concludes the inductive proof.
Remark 4.19 Let Γ be a stochastic game where the payoff function depends only on the state
but not the actions, the proof for the above result follows the same way.
5 Application to recursive games with signals
In this last section, we apply our result to the model of finite recursive games with signals where
one player is more informed than the other player. Introducing an auxiliary stochastic game
similar to the one defined in Gensbittel et al. [3], we show that the study of such a recursive
game can be reduced to the study of recursive game with a countable state space satisfying the
assumption of Corollary 3.4.
5.1 Model
The following model of general repeated game is introduced in Mertens et al. [8]. A repeated
game Γ = (K,I,J,C,D, g, q) is given by
• a finite state space: K.
• two finite action spaces I and J .
• two finite signal spaces C and D.
• a payoff function: g ∶K × I × J → [−1,+1].
• a transition probability function (on states and signals): q from K ×I ×J to ∆(K ×C ×D).
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Denote by Γ(π) the game with an initial probability distribution π ∈ ∆(K × C ×D), which is
played as follows. Initially, the triple (k1, c1, d1) is drawn according to π. At stage 1: player
1 learns c1 and player 2 learns d1. Then simultaneously player 1 chooses an action i1 ∈ I and
player 2 chooses an action j1 ∈ J . The stage payoff is g(k1, i1, j1), and the new triple (k2, c2, d2)
is drawn according to q(k1, i1, j1). The game then proceeds to stage 2: player 1 observes c2, and
player 2 observes d2 etc...
We assume that each player’s signal contains his own action. Formally, there exists ıˆ ∶ C → I
and ˆ ∶ D → J such that
∀k ∈K, ∑
k′,c,d
q(k, ıˆ(c), ˆ(d))(k′, c, d) = 1.
We will focus on repeated games with the following two features: recursive and one player is
more informed than the other.
Definition 5.1 The repeated game Γ is recursive if there exist K0 and K∗, a partition of K
such that:
• the stage payoff is 0 on active states: ∀(k, i, j) ∈K0 × I × J , g(k, i, j) = 0.
• states in K∗ are absorbing: ∀k ∈K∗, ∑c∈C,d∈D q(k, i, j)(k, c, d) = 1 for all (i, j) ∈ I × J and
g(k, i, j) depends only on k.
In the rest of the paper, a recursive repeated game will be called a recursive games with signals.
Definition 5.2 Player 1 is more informed than player 2 in the recursive game Γ if there exists
a mapping dˆ ∶ C →D such that, if E denotes {(k, c, d) ∈K ×C ×D, dˆ(c) = d}, then
q(k, i, j)(E) = 1, ∀(k, i, j) ∈K × I × J.
Notation 5.3 We denote by: ∆1(K ×C ×D) = {π∣π(E) = 1}.
We define similarly that player 2 is more informed than player 1. Whenever player 1 is more
informed than player 2 and player 2 is more informed than player 1, Γ is a repeated game with
symmetric signals. We denote by ∆∗(K ×C ×D) the set of symmetric initial distributions.
Remark 5.4 By assumption, if player 1 is more informed than player 2, he learns especially
the action played by player 2 since it is included in the signal of player 2. Player 2 is in general
not informed of the action played by player 1.
In Gensbittel et al. [3], the authors considered a weaker notion of "a more informed player"
but they made a different assumption on the transition function, especially that the less informed
player has no influence on the evolution of beliefs of both players. It is not clear if our result still
holds under this weaker assumption.
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5.2 Evaluation
At stage t, the space of past histories of player 1 is H1t = (C × I)t−1 × C and the space of past
histories of player 2 is H2t = (D × J)t−1 ×D. Let H∞ = (K × C ×D × I × J)∞ be the space of
infinite plays. For any play h = (ks, cs, ds, is, js)s≥1, we denote by ht its projection on Ht, by h1t
its projection on H1t , and by h
2
t its projection on H
2
t .
A (behavior) strategy for player 1 is a sequence (σt)t≥1 of functions σt ∶ H1t → ∆(I). A
(behavior) strategy for player 2 is a sequence τ = (τt)t≥1 of functions τt ∶H2t →∆(J). We denote
by Σ and T players’ respective sets of strategies. An initial distribution π ∈ ∆(K ×C ×D) and
a couple of strategies (σ, τ) define a probability distribution over the set of infinite plays, which
we denote by Pπσ,τ . Let E
π
σ,τ be the expectation w.r.t. to P
π
σ,τ .
For any given π ∈ ∆(K ×C ×D), let γn(π,σ, τ) (resp. γλ(π,σ, τ)) be the expected n-stage
payoff (resp. λ-discounted payoff) associated with (σ, τ) ∈ Σ × T . We denoted by vn(π) the
n-stage value and by vλ(π) the λ-discounted value.
Definition 5.5 Given an initial distribution π ∈∆(K×C×D), the game Γ(π) has an asymptotic
value v(π) if:
v(π) = lim
n→∞
vn(π) = lim
λ→0
vλ(π).
Definition 5.6 Given an initial distribution π ∈ ∆(K ×C ×D), the game Γ(π) has a uniform
maxmin v∞(π) if:
• Player 1 can guarantee v∞(π), i.e., for all ε > 0 there exists a strategy σ∗ ∈ Σ of player 1
and n0 ≥ 1 such that
∀n ≥ n0, ∀τ ∈ T , γn(π,σ∗, τ) ≥ v∞(π) − ε.
• Player 2 can defend v∞(π), i.e., for all ε > 0 and for every strategy σ ∈ Σ of player 1, there
exists n0 ≥ 1 and τ∗ ∈ T such that
∀n ≥ n0, γn(π,σ, τ∗) ≤ v∞(π) + ε.
The game Γ(π) has a uniform minmax v∞(π) is defined similarly if player 2 can guarantee
v∞(π) and player 1 can defend v∞(π).
Definition 5.7 Given an initial distribution π ∈∆(K ×C ×D), we say that Γ(π) has a uniform
value if both v¯∞(π) and v∞(π) exist and are equal. Whenever the uniform value exists, we denote
it by v∞(π).
5.3 Results
Theorem 5.8 Let Γ be a recursive game such that player 1 is more informed than player 2. Then
for every distribution π ∈ ∆1(K × C ×D), both the asymptotic value and the uniform maxmin
exist and are equal:
v∞(π) = lim vn(π) = lim vλ(π)
By symmetry, we deduce a similar result by exchanging the roles of player 1 and player 2. When
the information is symmetric, both results are true and we obtain the existence of the uniform
value.
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Corollary 5.9 Let Γ be a recursive game with symmetric signals. Then for every π ∈ ∆∗(K ×
C ×D), the game Γ(π) has a uniform value.
It is known from Ziliotto [19] that stochastic games with symmetric signals may have no uniform
value. Therefore recursive games have very particular properties. It is a challenging task to
identify the subclass of repeated games with v∞(π) = lim vn(π) = lim vλ(π).
Remark 5.10 Note that we have assumed that the stage payoff on absorbing states does not
depend on the actions played. Under this assumption, players’ strategies have only an influence
on non-absorbing plays. Therefore, without loss of generality, we assume in the following that
players observe whenever an absorption occurs and in which state it is.
If we consider that the payoff in absorbing states still depends on the actions played, then our
proof does not work. Indeed the auxiliary game introduced in Proposition 5.16 is not recursive
anymore. The result v∞(π) = lim vn(π) = lim vλ(π) is unknown for this general case.
Remark 5.11 It is not known whether recursive games with any structure of signals have a
uniform value. As highlighted in Rosenberg and Vieille [12], the equicontinuity of the λ-discounted
value functions is sufficient in order to deduce the existence of the uniform value for recursive
games (with perfect observations). For a recursive game with any structure of signals, one can
introduce the game associated with a universal belief space but we do not know a metric on this
space such that the λ-discounted values or the n-stage values are equicontinuous/totally bounded.
5.4 Proof of Theorem 5.8
We introduce some notations concerning different belief hierarchies. Denote byB1 =∆(K) the set
of beliefs of player 1 on the state variable. Denote by B2 =∆f(B1) =∆f(∆(K)) the set of beliefs
of player 2 on the (first-order) beliefs of player 1. Finally, we denote by∆f(B2) =∆f(∆f(∆(K)))
the set of probability distibutions over the second-order beliefs of player 2.
Overview of the proof
We fix Γ a recursive game with signals such that player 1 is more informed than player 2. The
first subsection presents general properties for repeated games with one player more informed
than the other. Given any π ∈ ∆1(K × C ×D), we can define the distribution of the beliefs of
player 2 on the beliefs of player 1 about the state. This defines a function Φ from∆1(K×C×D) to
∆f(B2). Applying results in Gensbittel et al. [3], we know that vn(π) depends on π only through
Φ(π). This enables us to show that the value function vn, defined on ∆1(K × C ×D), induces
a canonical function vˆn defined on B2 such that vn(π) = vˆn(Φ(π)) and the family {vˆn, n ≥ 1} is
totally bounded.
In the second subsection, we introduce an auxiliary recursive game G which is defined on B2
and is played with pure actions. We prove in Proposition 5.17 that the n-stage value of Gn is
equal to vˆn. Therefore, G satisfies the conditions of Corollary 3.4 and it has a uniform value w∞.
It follows that Γ(π) has an asymptotic value equal to w∞(Φ(π)).
The third subsection proves that (cf. Proposition 5.22) player 1 can uniformly guarantee
w∞(Φ(π)) in Γ(π) by mimicking uniform ε-optimal strategies in G(Φ(π)).
The last subsection proves that (cf. Proposition 5.25) that player 2 can uniformly defend
w∞(Φ(π)) by introducing a second auxiliary recursive game R.
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5.4.1 Canonical value function vˆn
We follow in this subsection Gensbittel et al. [3] to introduce the canonical function vˆn. Note
that to obtain results in this subsection, the additional assumption that player 1 controls the
transition (made later in their paper) is not used in Gensbittel et al. [3].
For convenience, we extend the definition of Γ(π) to a larger family of initial probability
distributions. Given any two finite sets C ′ and D′ and π ∈ ∆1(K ×C ′ ×D′), Γ(π) is the game
where (k, c′, d′) is drawn at stage 1 according to π, player 1 observes c′, player 2 observes d′
(which is contained in c′ π − a.s.) and then from stage 2 on, the game is played as previously
described with signals in C and D.
For any random variable ξ defined on a probability space (Ω,A,P) and F a sub σ-algebra of
A, let LP(ξ ∣ F) denote the conditional distribution of ξ given F , which is seen as a F-measurable
random variable3 and let LP(ξ) denote the distribution of ξ.
Notation 5.12 For every strategy profile (σ, τ) ∈ Σ×T , we denote the first-order belief of player
1 on K at stage n given h1n by pn ∈ B1, the second-order belief of player 2, i.e., his belief about the
belief of player 1 on K at stage n given h2n by xn ∈ B2, and the distribution of xn by ηn ∈∆f(B2),
i.e.,
pn ≜ LPπστ (kn ∣ h1n), xn ≜ LPπστ (pn∣h2n), and ηn ≜ LPπστ (xn).
Notation 5.13 For any π ∈∆1(K ×C ′ ×D′) where C ′ and D′ are two finite sets, the image of
π is given by the following function in ∆f(B2):
Φ(π) ≜ Lπ (Lπ (Lπ(k1∣c1)∣d1)) ,
= ∑
d∈D′
π(d)δ(∑c∈C′ π(c∣d)δπ(.∣c,d)).
The interpretation of Φ(π) is as follows: with probability π(d), player 2 observes the signal d
and believes that: player 1 received the signal c with probability π(c∣d) and therefore player 1’s
belief over K is π(.∣c, d).
The assumptions imply that if π ∈ ∆1(K ×C ′ ×D′), then π satisfies the following two prop-
erties:
P1) π(c)π(k, c, d) = π(k, c)π(c, d), ∀(k, c, d) ∈K ×C ′ ×D′.
P2) There exists a map f1 = fπ1 ∶ C
′ → B2 such that x1 = f1(c1), π-almost surely.
Under P1) and P2), Proposition 1 of Gensbittel et al. [3] applies and we obtain the following
result, which states that the value of any n-stage game depends on any initial distribution π only
through its image Φ(π).
Proposition 5.14 [Gensbittel et al. 2014] Let C ′ and D′ be two finite sets. Let π,π′ ∈
∆1(K ×C ′ ×D′) and let n ≥ 1. If Φ(π) = Φ(π), then vn(π) = vn(π′).
3All random variables appearing here take only finitely many values so that the definition of conditional laws
does not require any additional care about measurability.
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Reciprocally, given η ∈∆f(B2), let us construct a canonical distribution π satisfying Φ(π) = η.
The canonical game Γˆ(η). Given η ∈ ∆f(B2). Define two finite sets D′ ∶= supp(η) ⊆ B2 and
C ′ ∶=D′ × (⋃x∈supp(η) supp(x)), and a probability distribution π(η) ∈∆(K ×C ′ ×D′) by
∀(k, p) ∈K ×B1, x, x′ ∈ B2, π(k, (p,x), x′) ∶=
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
η(x)x(p)p(k) if x = x′
0 if x ≠ x′.
By construction, π(η) can be seen as an element of ∆1(K ×C ′ ×D′), and satisfies Φ(π(η)) = η.
The canonical game of Γ(π) is denoted as Γˆ(η). Its value, denoted by vˆn(η), is equal to vn(π(η))
the value of Γn(π(η)). If η = δx for some x ∈ B2, we denote vˆn(x) for vˆn(δx).
Informally, the game Γˆ(η) proceeds as follows: η is common knowledge, player 2 is informed
about the realization x of a random variable with law η (player 2 learns his beliefs). Then player
1 is informed about x (his opponent’s beliefs) and about the realization p of a random variable
with law x (his own beliefs). The state variable is finally chosen according to p, but no player
observes it.
By the above construction, one obtains that: vn(π) = vˆn(Φ(π)) for any π ∈∆1(K ×C ′ ×D′).
The result below follows from Proposition 2 of Gensbittel et al. [3]. The Wasserstein metric
d on B2 =∆(B1) is defined by:
∀x, y ∈ B2, d(x, y) = sup
f∈D
∣∫
B1
f(p)x(dp) −∫
B1
f(p)y(dp)∣ ,
where D is the set of 1-Lipschitz function from (B1, ∥.∥1) to [−1,1].
Proposition 5.15 [Gensbittel et al. 2014] Let η ∈∆f(B2), n ≥ 1 and let x ∈ B2. Then, vˆn(η) is
linear on ∆f(B2) and, as a mapping on B2, vˆn(x) is 1-Lipschitz for the Wasserstein metric d.
Since the state space B2 is totally bounded for the Wasserstein metric, we deduce by Arzela-
Ascoli theorem that the set of functions {vˆn, n ≥ 1} is totally bounded.
5.4.2 Auxiliary recursive game and asymptotic value
Let G = (X,A,B,G, ℓ) be the stochastic game played in pure strategies, defined by:
• the state space X =∆f(∆(K)) (endowed with the Wasserstein metric d).
• the action space A = {f ∶ ∆(K) → ∆(I)} and for all x ∈ X, A(x) = {supp(x) → ∆(I)} for
player 1.
• the action space B =∆(J) for player 2.
• the payoff function G ∶ X → [−1,1], defined for any x ∈X by G(x) ∶= ∑p∈∆(X) g(p)x(p).
• the transition function ℓ ∶ X ×A ×B → ∆f(X) defined as ℓ(x,a, b) ∶= Φ(Q(x,a, b)). Here,
Q(x,a, b) ∈ ∆f(K × (∆(K) × C) × D) is the joint distribution of (k2, (p, c2), d2) in the
canonical game Γ̂(δx) when the players play (σ1, τ1) = (a, b) at stage 1. The sets K,C,D
and supp(x) being finite, Q can be seen as an element in ∆1(K ×C ′ ×D′) with C ′ a finite
subset of ∆(K) ×C and D′ =D.
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For any x ∈ X, we denote by G(x) the game starting at x. We extend the definition to G(z)
for any z ∈∆f(X) such that the initial state is chosen randomly along z.
Since players observe when and where absorption occurs, their beliefs (first and second-order)
are either supported on K0 (therefore respectively in ∆(K0) and in ∆(∆(K0))) or supported
on each single point k ∈K∗ (to be δk and to be δδk).
Proposition 5.16 Let Xr = ∆f(∆(K0))⋃{δδk ∶ k ∈ K∗}. The game Gr = (Xr,A,B,G, ℓ) with
the state space Xr is well defined and is recursive with the absorbing states {δδk ∶ k ∈K∗}.
In the following, we identify each δδk with k itself for any k ∈K
∗, and write Xr =∆f(∆(K0))∪
K∗. By abuse of notations, we write again X for Xr and G for Gr.
Proposition 5.17 For every n ≥ 1, the n-stage game Gn has a value wn in pure strategies.
Moreover, for every x ∈ X, wn(x) = vˆn(x).
Proof. We prove the result by induction on n ≥ 1. Let n = 1. Given x ∈X, the game G1(x) has a
value w1(x) and it is equal to w1(x) = G(x) = ∑p g(p)x(p). It is equal to vˆ1(x) by construction.
This initializes our induction. Let n ≥ 1 such that wn, the value of Gn, exists in pure strategies,
and for every x ∈ X, wn(x) = vˆn(x). Gensbittel et al. [3] showed in the proof of their Proposition
5 that the family {vˆn, n ≥ 1} satisfies the Shapley equation: for every x ∈X and for every n ≥ 1,
vˆn+1(x) = sup
a∈A(x)
inf
b∈B
Eℓ(x,a,b) [ 1
n + 1
g(x,a, b) + n
n + 1
vˆn(x′)]
= inf
b∈B
sup
a∈A(x)
Eℓ(x,a,b) [ 1
n + 1
g(x,a, b) + n
n + 1
vˆn(x′)] ,
where the random variable x′ ∈X is chosen along the law ℓ(x,a, b)(⋅). By the inductive assump-
tion, we can replace vˆn by wn on the right hand side of above equation, to obtain that:
∀x ∈ X, vˆn+1(x) = sup
a∈A(x)
inf
b∈B
Eℓ(x,a,b) [ 1
n + 1
g(x) + n
n + 1
wn(x′)]
= inf
b∈B
sup
a∈A(x)
Eℓ(x,a,b) [ 1
n + 1
g(x) + n
n + 1
wn(x′)] .
We now use the above equation to show that both players can guarantee vˆn+1(x) in Gn+1(x) in
pure strategies. Let x ∈ X be fixed and a∗ be an action of player 1 such that
inf
b∈B
Eℓ(x,a∗,b) [ 1
n + 1
g(x) + n
n + 1
wn(x′)] ≥ vˆn+1(x). (5.1)
Again by inductive assumption, let σ∗n(x′) be an optimal pure strategy in Gn(x′),∀x′ ∈ X. We
define the strategy σ∗n+1(x) to play a∗ at the first stage and then σ∗n(x′) where x′ is the current
state at stage 2. σ∗n+1(x) is pure and guarantees player 1 the payoff in Gn+1(x) no smaller than
the left hand side of Equation (5.1), hence vˆn+1(x). A similar construction for player 2 finishes
the inductive proof.
Therefore, by Proposition 5.15 the family of n-stage values {wn} is totally bounded for the
uniform norm, and we can apply Corollary 3.4 (with infinite sets of actions) for the game G.
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Proposition 5.18 For every z ∈∆f(X), the game G(z) has a uniform value denoted by w∗∞(z).
Moreover both players can uniformly guarantee the value with pure strategies that depend on the
history of states but not on the past actions.
Since vn(π) = vˆn(Φ(π)) = wn(Φ(π)), and the same construction of the canonical value
function vˆλ implies vλ(π) = vˆλ(Φ(π)) = wλ(Φ(π)), we deduce the existence of the asymptotic
value in Γ(π). in the game Γ(π) for every π ∈∆1(K ×C ×D).
Proposition 5.19 For every π ∈∆1(K ×C ×D), we have
lim
n→∞
vn(π) = lim
λ→0
vλ(π) = w∗∞(Φ(π)).
5.4.3 Player 1 uniformly guarantees w∗∞
We first show that player 1 is able to compute in the original game (pt)t≥1 his first-order beliefs
and (xt)t≥1 the second-order beliefs of player 2 without knowing the strategy of player 2.
Lemma 5.20 Let (σ, τ) be a pair of strategies in Γ(π). For every t ≥ 1, pt = LPπσ,τ(kt∣h1t ) and
xt = LPπσ,τ (pt∣h2t ) are independent of τ for all h1t , h2t .
Proof. Let (σ, τ) be a pair of strategies and π ∈ ∆(K × C ×D), we write P ∶= Pπσ,τ for short.
Let h = (ks, cs, ds, is, js)s≥1 ∈H∞. For any t ≥ 1, we define
β(ht) = π(k1, c1, d1) t−1∏
ℓ=1
q(kℓ, iℓ, jℓ)(kℓ+1, cℓ+1, dℓ+1)
with the convention β(k1, c1, d1) = π(k1, c1, d1). These notations help to write
P(ht) = β(ht) t−1∏
ℓ=1
σt(h1ℓ)[iℓ]τℓ(h2ℓ)[jℓ].
The key point is that under P(⋅), it−1, jt−1 and dt are ct-measurable whereas jt−1 is dt-measurable.
It follows that after observing (c1, ..., ct), player 1’s belief is:
pt(kt) = P (kt∣c1, ..., ct) = P (kt∣c1, d1, i1, j1, ...., ct, dt)
=
∑k′
1
,...,k′
t−1
P(k′
1
, c1, d1, i1, j1..., kt, ct, dt)
∑k′
1
,...,k′
t−1,k
′
t
P(k′
1
, c1, d1, i1, ..., k
′
t, ct, dt) =
∑k′
1
,...,k′
t−1
β(k′
1
, c1, d1, i1, j1, ..., kt , ct, dt)
∑k′
1
,...,k′
t−1,kt
β(k′
1
, c1, d1, i1, j1, ..., k
′
t, ct, dt) ,
which depends on neither σ nor τ . We now consider xt = LP(pt∣d1, ...dt) for a given observed
history h2t = (d1, ..., dt) of player 2, which is decomposed as:
xt = LP(LP(kt+1∣c1, ..., ct)∣d1, .., dt) = ∑
c′
1
,...,c′t
P(c′1, ..., c′t ∣d1, ..., dt)δLP(kt+1∣c′1,...,c′t).
By the previous result that LP(kt+1∣c′1, ..., c′t) does not depend on τ , it is sufficient to prove that
P(c′1, ..., c′t ∣d1, ..., dt) is independent of τ . Let us consider a sequence of signals (c′1, ..., c′t) inducing
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(d1, ..., dt) that we complete with (i′1, ..., i′t) the sequence of actions it contains. This gives us
P(c′1, ..., c′t ∣d1, ..., dt) = P(c′1, d1, i′1, j1, ..., c′t , dt∣d1, j1, ..., dt) = P(c
′
1, d1, i
′
1, j1, ..., c
′
t, dt)
P(d1, j1, ..., dt)
=
∑k′
1
,...,k′t
β(h′t)∏t−1ℓ=1 σℓ(h′1ℓ )[i′ℓ]
∑k′
1
,...,k′t
∑c′
1
,...,c′t
β(h′t)∏t−1ℓ=1 σℓ(h′1ℓ )[i′ℓ] ,
where h′ℓ = (k′1, c′1, d1, i′1, j1, ..., k′ℓ, c′ℓ, dℓ) is the history of stage ℓ and h′1ℓ = (c′1, i′1, ..., c′ℓ) is the
private history of player 1 of stage ℓ. The right hand side of the above equation does not depend
on the strategy of player 2 and the result is obtained.
Before building the strategy of player 1, we prove that the transition rule ℓ(⋅) ∶ X ×A ×B →
∆f(X) of the auxiliary game is linear with respect to b ∈ B (the action of player 2).
Lemma 5.21 For any (x,a) ∈ X ×A and b = ∑s∈S λsbs a convex combination in B, we have
ℓ(x,a, b) = ∑
s∈S
λsℓ (x,a, bs) .
Proof. Let (x,a) ∈ X × A and b ∈ B. Recall that Q ∶= Q(x,a, b) denotes a distribution
in ∆f(K × (∆(K) × C) × D), which can be seen as as an element in ∆1(K × C ′ × D′) with
C ′ = supp(x) × C a finite subset of ∆(K) and D′ = D We have by definition of the image
mapping Φ(⋅): ℓ(x,a, b) = Φ(Q) = ∑d′∈D′ Q(d′)δLQ(LQ(k∣c′)∣d′).
Similarly to the previous lemma, for every (c′, d′) = ((p, c), d′) ∈ C ′×D′, LQ(LQ(k∣(p, c))∣d′)
does not depend on b. Indeed, the signal (c′, d′) contains the action (i1, j1) = (ˆı(c′), ˆ(d′)) and
c′ contains d′ a.s. It follows that
PQ(k∣p, c) = a(p)[ˆı(c)]b[ˆ(c)]q
K×C(p, ıˆ(c), ˆ(c))(k, c′)
a(p)[ˆı(c)]b[ˆ(c)]qC(p, ıˆ(c), ˆ(c))(c′) =
qK×C(p, ıˆ(c), ˆ(c))(k, c′)
qC(p, ıˆ(c), ˆ(c))(c′)
and
PQ(p, c∣d′) = x(p)q
C(p, a(p), ˆ(d′))(c)
∑p∈supp(x)x(p)qD(p, a(p), ˆ(d′))(d′) .
Since these quantities do not depend on b, we will not precise b in the following. The application
Q(x,a, b) being linear in b, we can easily deduce the announced result:
Φ (Q (x,a, b)) = ∑
d′∈D′
Q (x,a, b) (d′)δLQ(x,a,.)(LQ(x,a,.)(k∣c′)∣d′)
= ∑
d′∈D′
(∑
s∈S
λsQ(x,a, bs)(d′)δLQ(x,a,.)(LQ(x,a,.)(k∣c′)∣d′))
= ∑
s∈S
λsΦ(Q(x,a, bs).
We now use the two previous lemmas to prove that player 1 uniformly guarantees w∗∞ (Φ(π))
in the game Γ(π).
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Proposition 5.22 Player 1 uniformly guarantees w∗∞ (Φ(π)) in Γ(π).
Proof. Fix any ε > 0. We divide the proof into three steps. First, we define the optimal
strategy σˆ in Γ(π). Then we show how to link the distribution over the states in G to the dis-
tribution of second-order beliefs in Γ. Finally, we deduce that the strategy σˆ is uniform ε-optimal.
Step I: Defining the strategy.
Consider the auxiliary game G(z) with z = Φ(π) ∈ ∆f(X). According to Proposition 5.18,
player 1 has pure uniform ε-optimal strategies which depend on histories only through the states
but not the actions. With a slight abuse of notations, there exists σˆ∗ ∶ ⋃∞t=1X
t → A = {a ∶
∆(K)→∆(I)} and N0 ≥ 1 such that
γˆn(z, σˆ∗, τˆ) ≥ w∗∞(z) − ε for all n ≥ N0 and for all τˆ ∶ ∞⋃
t=1
Xt → B =∆(J)
where γˆn(z, σˆ∗, τˆ) is the expected n-stage average payoff in the auxiliary game G(z) induced by(z, σˆ∗, τˆ).
We define the strategy σ∗ ∈ Σ in the game Γ(π) such that for any h1t ,
σ∗(h1t ) = σˆ∗(x1, ..., xt)[pt] with pt = LPπ
σ∗
(kt∣h1t ) and xt = LPπ
σ∗
(pt∣h2t ).
By Lemma 5.20, this is a well defined strategy of player 1 since he can compute pt and xt at
every stage t ≥ 1. We now check that the strategy σ∗ uniformly guarantees w∗∞(z) − ε in Γ(π).
Step II: Linking the probability law of beliefs
Let τ ∈ T be a strategy in Γ(π). We define a strategy τˆ in G (Φ(π)) such that (π,σ∗, τ) and(Φ(π), σˆ, τˆ) generate the same probability law for (x1, ..., xt, ...). With a slight abuse in notation,
we denote by τˆ the strategy in G such that for all (x1, ..., xt) ∈ Xt,
τˆ(x1, ..., xt) = ∑
h2t ∈H
2
t (x1,...,xt)
P
π
σ∗,τ(h2t ∣x1, ..., xt)τ(h2t ),
where H2t (x1, ..., xt) = {h2t ∈H2t ∣LPπ
σ∗,τ
(kl∣h2ℓ) = xℓ, 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ t} denotes the set of player 2’s t-stage
histories in Γ that induce the beliefs (x1, ..., xt).
Lemma 5.23 Let σ∗ and τˆ be constructed as above given σˆ∗ and τ , we have:
∀t ≥ 1, LPπ
σ∗,τ
(x1, ..., xt) = LPz
σˆ∗,τˆ
(x1, ..., xt).
Proof of Lemma 5.23: We prove the lemma by induction on t ≥ 1. For t = 1, the law of x1 is
independent of the strategy profile. By definition of the image mapping Φ(⋅),
LPπ
σ∗,τ
(x1) = Lπ (Lπ(Lπ(k1∣c1)∣d1)) = Φ(π).
As Φ(π) = z, the probability law to choose the initial state x1 ∈X in G(z), LPz
σˆ∗,τˆ
(x1) = Φ(π).
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Suppose now that we have proved that LPπ
σ∗,τ
(x1, ..., xt) = LPz
σˆ∗,τˆ
(x1, ..., xt) for some t ≥ 1. It
is then sufficient to prove that conditional on any realization4 s˜t ∶= (x˜1, ..., x˜t) ∈ (B2)t,
LPπ
σ∗,τ
(xt+1∣x1 = x˜1, ..., xt = x˜t) = LPz
σˆ∗,τˆ
(xt+1∣x1 = x˜1, ..., xt = x˜t).
Fix some s˜t = (x˜1, ..., x˜t) ∈ Xt. By definition of τˆ and the linearity of ℓ showed in Lemma 5.21,
we know that
LPz
σˆ∗,τˆ
(xt+1∣x1 = x˜1, ..., xt = x˜t) = ℓ(x˜t, σˆ∗(s˜t), τˆ (s˜t))
= ∑
h2t ∈H
2
t (s˜t)
P
π
σ∗,τ(h2t ∣s˜t)ℓ(x˜t, σˆ∗(s˜t), τ(h2t )). (5.2)
By definition of the conditional expectation, we have in Γ,
LPπ
σ∗,τ
(xt+1∣x1 = x˜1, ..., xt = x˜t) = ∑
h2t ∈H
2
t (s˜t)
P
π
σ∗,τ(h2t ∣s˜t)LPπ
σ∗,τ
(xt+1∣h2t ).
Thus, it is sufficient to prove that for every h2t ∈ H
2
t (s̃t), ℓ(x˜t, σˆ∗(s˜t), τ(h2t )) = LPπ
σ∗,τ
(xt+1∣h2t ).
Let h2t ∈ H
2
t (x˜t) and Q[h2t ] ∶= Q (x˜t, σˆ∗(s˜t), τ(h2t )) ∈ ∆f (K × (∆(K) ×C) ×D) the joint dis-
tribution of (kt+1, (pt, ct+1), dt+1) in the canonical game Γˆ(δx˜t) when (σˆ∗(s˜t), τ(h2t )) ∈ A ×B is
played. By definition of the image mapping Φ(⋅) and σ∗, we obtain
LPπ
σ∗,τ
(xt+1∣h2t ) = LQ[h2t ] (LQ[h2t ](LQ[h2t ](kt+1∣ct+1)∣dt+1)) = Φ(Q[h2t ]) = ℓ(x˜t, σˆ∗(s˜t), τ(h2t )).
◻
Step III: Conclusion of the proof
Finally, let us compare the payoffs in both games. If k∗ ∈ K∗, we have G(k∗) = g(k∗) =
E
π
σ∗,τ [g(kt)∣xt = k∗]. If xt ∈ (∆f (∆(K0)) ), we have G(xt) = 0 = Eπσ∗,τ [g(kt)∣xt]. It follows that
for every xt ∈ X, we have G(xt) = Eπσ∗,τ [g(kt)∣xt]. By taking conditional expectation, Lemma
5.23 implies that Ezσˆ∗,τˆ [G(xt)] = Eπσ∗,τ [g(kt)]. Since σˆ∗ is uniform ε-optimal in the auxiliary
game G (Φ(π)), we obtain
γn(π,σ∗, τ) = γˆn(Φ(π), σˆ∗, τˆ) ≥ w∗∞(Φ(π)) − ε for all n ≥ N0.
Therefore, the strategy σ∗ uniformly guarantees w∗∞(Φ(π)) − ε in Γ(π).
5.4.4 Player 2 uniformly defends w∗∞
We now prove that player 2 can defend w∗∞(Φ(π)) = lim vn(π) = lim vλ(π). The situation of
player 2 is different since he is allowed to know the strategy of player 1. In order to prove this
result, we introduce another auxiliary recursive game R.
For any n ≥ 1, let H ′n ⊆Hn be the set of n-stage histories such that player 1 can deduce player
2’s private signals, and H0n ⊆ Hn be the set of n-stage histories containing only non-absorbing
states. We consider the following game R where the set of states is almost the set of distribution
over all finite histories. It is defined as follows:
4For this part of the proof it is convenient to differentiate the random variable describing the second order
belief (or the state in G) that will be denoted by xt from its realization denoted by x˜t.
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• the state space is Z = Z0⋃K∗ where Z0 = ⋃n≥1∆(H0n ∩H ′n),
• the action space of player 1 is A = ⋃n≥1{f ∶ H1n → ∆(I)} and for any πn ∈ ∆(Hn),
A(πn) = {f ∶H1n →∆(I)},
• the action space of player 2 is B = ⋃n≥1{f ∶ H2n → ∆(J)} and for any πn ∈ ∆(Hn),
B(πn) = {f ∶H2n → ∆(J)},
• the transition Q ∶ Z ×A ×B →∆f(Z) is given by:
∀(k∗, a, b) ∈K∗ ×A ×B, Q(k∗, a, b) = δk∗ ,
and
∀(z, a, b) ∈ Z0 ×A ×B, Q(z, a, b) = Q0(z, a, b)δπ0 + ∑
k∈K∗
Q(z, a, b)(k∗)δk∗ ,
where Q(z, a, b)(k∗) is the probability of absorption in state k∗ at the next stage given by
Q(z, a, b)(k∗) = ∑
hn,i,j,c,d
z(hn)a(h1n)[i]b(h2n)[j]q(kn, i, j)(k∗, c, d);
Q0(z, a, b) is the probability of no absorption given by
Q0(z, a, b) = ∑
hn,i,j,c,d
∑
k∈K0
z(hn)a(h1n)[i]b(h2n)[j]q(kn, i, j)(k, c, d),
and π0 ∈ Z0 is the conditional probability on not having absorbed, i.e.,
∀(hn, k, i, j, c, d) ∈Hn ×K × I × J ×C ×D, π0(hn, i, j, c, d) = z(hn)a(h1n)[i]b(h2n)[j]q(kn, i, j)(k, c, d)
Q0(z, a, b) .
• the stage payoff function R ∶ Z ×A ×B → [−1,+1] is given by
∀(πn, a, b) ∈ Z0 ×A ×B, R(πn, a, b) = 0,
and
∀(k∗, a, b) ∈K∗ ×A ×B, R(k∗, a, b) = g(k∗).
By construction, the game R is recursive. We denote by Σ̃ (resp. T̃ ) the set of behavior
strategy for player 1 (resp. for player 2) in the game R.
Proposition 5.24 For every π ∈ Z0 and every n ≥ 1, the n-stage game Rn(π) has a value in
history independent pure strategies, which is denoted by ṽn(π) and
ṽn(π) = vn(π).
Moreover, if player 2 can uniformly defend some payoff level v in the game R(π) with pure
strategies then he can also uniformly defend v in the game Γ(π).
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Proof. First, a strategy σ of player 1 in Γ is a sequence of applications (σn)n≥1 such that σn
is a mapping from Hn
1
to ∆(I). By definition, this is a sequence of actions in the game R, i.e.,
a history independent pure strategy in R. Similarly, a strategy τ of player 2 in Γ induces a
sequence of actions in R. By definition of Q and R, it follows that for every π ∈ Z0, σ ∈ Σ and
τ ∈ T ,
γn(π,σ, τ) = γ̃n(π,σ, τ). (5.3)
Let σ be an optimal strategy of player 1 in the game Γn(π). Consider now a pure strategy
τ̃ ∈ T̃ . The triple (π,σ, τ̃ ) generates a probability distribution P on (Z × A × B)N such that
there exists at most one play (πt, at, bt)t≥1 that is non absorbing P − a.s., i.e., (πt, at, bt)t≥1 ∈(Z0 ×A ×B)N. Define the strategy τ ∈ T of player 2 in Γ(π) by setting τt = bt for all t ≥ 1. We
obtain
γ̃n(π,σ, τ̃ ) = γ̃n(π,σ, τ) = γn(π,σ, τ) ≥ vn(π).
Therefore, player 1 guarantees the payoff vn(π) in R(π) with the history independent pure strat-
egy σ. Similarly, player 2 can guarantee vn(π) with a history independent pure strategy and
ṽn(π) = vn(π).
Finally, let us assume that player 2 can uniformly defend the payoff level v with pure strategies
in the game R(π). Let ε > 0 and σ ∈ Σ. Interpreting σ as an history-independent strategy in R,
there exist N0 ≥ 1 and a pure strategy τ̃ ∈ T̃ such that
∀n ≥ N0, γ̃n(π,σ, τ̃ ) ≤ v + ε. (5.4)
As in the previous paragraph, we can associate to the triple (π,σ, τ̃ ) a unique play (πt, at, bt)t≥1
in (Z0 ×A ×B)N and define the strategy τ ∈ T of player 2 in Γ(π) by setting τt = bt for all t ≥ 1.
We obtain
∀n ≥ N0, γn(π,σ, τ) = γ̃n(π,σ, τ) = γ̃n(π,σ, τ̃ ) ≤ v + ε.
This proves that player 2 can uniformly defend v in Γ(π).
We conclude by showing that the game R fulfills the conditions of Corollary 3.4.
Proposition 5.25 Player 2 uniformly defends w∗∞ (Φ(π)) in Γ(π).
Proof. We already noticed that the game R is recursive. Let π ∈ ∆(H0n ∩H ′n) ⊆ Z0 for some
n ≥ 1. Since player 1 is more informed than player 2 (π supported on H ′n), π can be identified as
an element in ∆1(K ×C ′ ×D′) for some finite C ′ and D′. By Proposition 5.24, we obtain that
for any π ∈ Z0,
ṽn(π) = vn(π) = vˆn (Φ(π)) .
According to Corollary 5.15, the family {vˆn, n ≥ 1} considered as functions on B2 is totally
bounded, and so is the family of their linear extensions to ∆f(B2).
By Corollary 3.4, R(π) has a uniform value w∗∞ (Φ(π)) in pure strategies for every π ∈
∆1(K ×C ×D). It follows from Proposition 5.24 that player 2 can uniformly defend w∗∞ (Φ(π))
in Γ(π).
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